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Abstract
We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets whole-
sale prices in two markets that are integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports
(PI). The manufacturing ﬁrm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing
interests: restricting competition in the PI-recipient market, avoiding resource wastes
due to actual trade, and reducing the double-markup problem in the PI-source nation.
These trade-oﬀs imply the counterintuitive result that both wholesale and retail prices
could diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even as the volume of PI increases.
Thus, in some circumstances it may be misleading to think of PI as an unambiguous
force for price integration.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The European Union has adopted a rigorous regime of regional exhaustion, which states
that parallel trade - i.e. cross-border arbitrage - is impermissible from outside the commu-
nity but the ﬁrst sale within its territory exhausts the rights of the original manufacturing
ﬁrm to restrict further trade of its product in the common market.1 Both the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice have consistently defended the presumed
importance of parallel trade in support of the single market (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2003).
The essential justiﬁcation for this policy is a belief that parallel imports generate com-
petition at the retail level, inducing a tendency toward retail price convergence and pro-
competitive gains from price integration.2
Despite these long-standing eﬀorts to integrate markets, there remains considerable retail
price divergence within the European Union, which continues to puzzle observers. For ex-
ample, the European Central Bank (2002, p. 39), recently stated that, ”The data available
suggest that price level dispersion for many tradeable goods and services remains higher
between euro area countries than within individual countries, implying that further im-
provements in the functioning of the Internal Market are possible.”
One explanation for this failure of prices to move together could be that imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms may be capable of sustaining divergent retail prices in reaction to reduc-
tions in trade barriers. In this paper we set out such a model and explore fully the price
impacts of PI in a setting where an original manufacturer - i.e. the holder of the intel-
lectual property rights - sells its product through independent distributors in two national
markets.3 Our point of departure is the observation that the bulk of PI actually takes
place at the wholesale level, rather than the retail level (Maskus and Chen, 2002; National
Economic Research Associates, 1999).4 Because manufacturing ﬁr m sp l a c eg o o d so nt h e
1The policy is essentially equivalent to the U.S. ”ﬁrst-sale doctrine” under which initial sale of a good
inside the territorial United States exhausts further rights to control distribution. Thus, our analysis of PI
and exclusive territories applies also to ”gray-market” unauthorized trade within the United States.
2There exists evidence that this is indeed relevant in some markets. For instance, Ganslandt and Maskus
(2004) present empirical evidence that competition from European PI ﬁrms in the pharmaceutical sector
has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on original manufacturers’ prices in Sweden.
3Friberg and Martensen (2001) oﬀer a model with similar conclusions but in a very diﬀerent analytical
context.
4The study by National Economic Research Associates (1999) reported survey evidence of signiﬁcant
ﬂows of parallel trade within the European Union in the early 1990s. While the report tended to focus on
retail price diﬀerences, it pointed out that the bulk of parallel trade happens at the wholesale or distributor
level. Maskus and Chen (2002) performed econometric analysis with detailed U.S. export-price data and
discovered that the international distribution of wholesale export prices did follow the predicted U-shaped
relationship in U.S. tariﬀ rates and that the level of such prices across destination regions depended on the
legal treatment of parallel trade in those regions. Thus, empirical evidence points to the vertical-control
2market initially through vertical contracts with local distributors, it is important to study
the implications of such contracts for PI volumes and the consequent scope for retail price
integration. In this context, EU competition policy also rigorously supports parallel trade
at the distributor level as a means of reducing market power through exclusive territories.
In fact, we ﬁnd that the claim that parallel imports unambiguously bring down retail
prices in expensive locations is misleading. We show that in some market circumstances,
for an important and empirically relevant range of trade costs, the existence of parallel
imports can cause retail prices both to diverge between markets and to increase in high-
cost locations, precisely opposite to the conventional intuition.5 The essential reason is that
original manufacturing ﬁrms that own intellectual property rights undertake vertical pricing
decisions to manage the threat and costs of PI, including consolidation of the number of
distributors as trade costs fall. Thus, a reorientation of competition policy within the EU
toward understanding vertical restraints seems in order.
In addition, we provide a welfare analysis of parallel trade and compare it with market
segmentation based on, for instance, exclusive territories or legal restraints.6 The analysis
advanced here builds on the insights in a paper by Chen and Maskus (2005) in several
important ways. They noted three essential eﬃciency tradeoﬀs in a model where a licensed
distributor in one market can trade goods back to the home market of the original manu-
facturer. The manufacturer has to balance the losses from a pro-competitive price eﬀect of
PI into its own market, on the one hand, and the resource costs wasted in the activity of
parallel trade and the double-markup problem in inducing a proﬁt-maximizing retail price
in the foreign market, on the other. The authors discovered a U-shaped welfare curve in the
cost of trading PI goods. If trade costs are low, the optimal regulatory policy is to permit
problem as being central to PI. This line of inquiry was pursued extensively within the EU context by
Ganslandt and Maskus (2003). Their empirical evidence supported the view that there are multiple causes
for PI. Econometric analysis of European prices suggested that both horizontal arbitrage and vertical-control
problems are important practical explanations for such trade. Pricing behavior by exporters from high-price
markets - such as Denmark and the United Kingdom - indicated that such ﬁrms increase export prices in
countries that are in close proximity (and therefore have low trade costs) in an attempt to deter PI.
5Arbritrage against diﬀerences in retail prices was the focus of early literature (Tarr 1985; Hilke 1988),
which found that rapid and large dollar appreciation generated rising volumes of parallel imports into the
United States.
6The welfare eﬀects of price-integrating horizontal arbitrage have been studied in several papers. In an
important theoretical paper, Malueg and Schwartz (1994) argued that a regime of uniform retail pricing
would be globally inferior to one in which ﬁrms could price-discriminate on the basis of countries grouped
by demand elasticity. Also arguing from a standard pricing model, Richardson (2002) argued that neither
a global policy of uniform pricing (international exhaustion) nor of full segmentation (national exhaustion)
could be supported as a Nash equilibrium, suggesting that negotiations on an international exhaustion regime
at the World Trade Organization would be frustrated.
3free parallel trade, for the pro-competitive gains dominate the other eﬃciency losses. How-
ever, at intermediate-to-high trade costs it is eﬃcient to ban PI to avoid ineﬃcient vertical
pricing.
Our model is diﬀerent and more general than that in Maskus and Chen (2002) and Chen
and Maskus (2005) as we permit vertical distributors in two markets, an approach that
generates a richer menu of potential price eﬀects even within the framework of Cournot
competition. With two independent distributors, parallel trade may harm consumers due
to the possibility that such trade could result in retail price divergence as trade costs
fall. Consumers may consequently gain, therefore, if policy permitted exclusive territories.
Maskus and Chen (2002) found a similar result but only for high PI costs.7
We believe that there is substantial scope for understanding better the implications of
parallel trade by focusing on models of vertical pricing behavior in markets integrated at
the wholesale level. It is conceivable that wholesale prices may be set in a way that oﬀsets
or even counteracts the anticipated impacts of an open PI regime. This is the point of
departure for the analysis that follows.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set out a basic model of parallel
imports in two vertically controlled markets that are linked by the possibility of PI. The
following section provides an analysis of three diﬀerent cases that emerge as equilibria for
diﬀerent ranges of trade costs. In the fourth section we take a closer look at the equilibrium
retail prices, proﬁts and consumer welfare. In the ﬁfth section we analyze the implications
of permitting retail arbitrage. We oﬀer concluding remarks in the ﬁnal section.
2. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF PARALLEL IMPORTS
W ed e v e l o pam o d e lo fv e r t i c a lp r i c i n gw i t hparallel imports. The model demonstrates
the three deleterious impacts of PI on the manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁts. First, competition
between distributors in the PI-recipient market reduces proﬁts through a ”pro-competitive
eﬀect” even as it raises consumer welfare there. Second, the act of engaging in PI wastes
resources in transport, which reduces proﬁts through a ”trade-cost eﬀect”. Finally, the need
to manage PI could generate an inability to set the optimal wholesale price of zero (equal
to marginal production costs) in the PI-source market. Speciﬁcally, this ”double-markup
eﬀect” reduces proﬁtability the greater the gap between wholesale price and marginal cost.
7In two related papers, Raﬀ and Schmidt (2005a, 2005b) analyze the implications of exclusive territories
used by ﬁrms in international trade. They concluded that trade liberalization may lead manufacturers to
oﬀset the loss of tariﬀ barriers with contracts imposing exclusive territories, which may decrease competition
and welfare.
4The original manufacturer musts t r i k eab a l a n c ea m o n gt h e s ei m p a c t si nc h o o s i n gi t sp r i c e s .
An original manufacturer, M, sells its product in two countries, A and B. Firm M
sells its product through an independent exclusive distributor in country A and another
independent exclusive distributor in country B. The demand in A is QA =1− p, and that
in B is QB = S (1 − bp), where S is the (relative) population of market B while we assume
that the population in A is normalized to 1. Manufacturer M has a constant marginal cost
of production normalized to zero, and the marginal cost of retailing in both countries is
normalized to zero as well.
Initially, we shall assume that consumer markets are segmented. Neither consumers nor
ﬁrms can buy the product at the retail level in one country and ship it to the other in
quantities suﬃcient to aﬀect prices.8 At the end of the paper we shall relax this assumption
and illustrate the eﬀects of arbitrage based on retail price diﬀerentials.
Suppose that the manufacturing ﬁrm M can oﬀer the distributor in market i (i = A,B)
any contract in the form (wi,T i), where wi is the wholesale price at which the distributor
purchases from M and Ti is a transfer payment (franchise fee) from the distributor to M.
However, M cannot prevent the distributor in market B from selling the product also in
market A, either directly or through intermediaries, such as ﬁrms specialized in parallel
trade. That is, either M cannot legally limit the distributor’s territory of sales, or it is too
costly for M to enforce any such constraint. Thus, we assume that the manufacturing ﬁrm
can only control supply with regular two-part tariﬀs of the kind envisioned here. We rule
out contracts that incorporate an agreement to limit parallel trade directly or indirectly.9
Another important assumption is that the manufacturing ﬁrm sells the products to the
distributors prior to the opening of the retail markets. The wholesale price (variable fee)
can only be charged based on the quantity sold by the manufacturing ﬁrm to the distrib-
utor, it cannot be charged based on the quantities sold by the distributors to consumers.
8Segmentation of consumer markets at the retail level can be motivated on several grounds. In some
industries consumer arbitrage is illegal, while parallel trade at the wholesale level is permitted. This is the
case with prescription drugs in the European Union and alcoholic beverages in the United States. In other
industries, physical products and non-tradeable services are tied, causing eﬀective market segmentation at
the retail level. Local warranties bundled with capital goods and local calling plans bundled with cell phones
are examples in this category. Finally, retail arbitrage can be prohibitively costly, while available margins
could support parallel trade at the wholesale level.
9The manufacturing ﬁrm can neither control quantities with supply curbs nor target parallel trade with
a ”dual-pricing” scheme (i.e. charging higher prices for products that are exported than for those sold
domestically). We consequently focus on the eﬀects of parallel imports for distributor-level competition
when the manufacturing ﬁrm uses a standard strategy to solve the vertical control problem (diﬀerentiating
wholesale prices while avoiding double marginalization) rather than trying to target parallel trade as such.
More sophisticated strategies may also be illegal under competition law in jurisdictions such as the European
Union.
5This is consistent with the manufacturing ﬁrm’s inability to directly control or monitor
quantities sold by the distributors. Consequently, the distributor contracts cannot be based
on subsequent retail supplies and the manufacturing ﬁrm must therefore oﬀer a contract
with a non-negative wholesale price, i.e. wi ≥ 0.10
We also assume that only the licensed distributor in market B can sell in that market.
Thus, the situation we have in mind describes one market protected from PI competition
but a vertical relationship that is vulnerable to wholesale-level competition in the other
market.11
Finally, assume that if the distributor in market B sells in market A, it incurs an additional
constant marginal cost t ≥ 0 and competes with the distributor in A in a Cournot fashion.
Let the quantities sold in A by the two distributors be q∗
A and q∗
B, respectively, and the
quantity sold in B by the sole distributor be qB. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a
pair (q∗
A,q∗
B) that constitute a Nash equilibrium for any (wi,T i) for i = A,B, together with
an optimal choice of qB by the distributor in market B for any (wB,T B) and an optimal
choice of (wi,T i) for i = A,B by the manufacturing ﬁrm M. Let w denote the vector
(wA,w B) and T denote the vector (TA,T B).
Our main objective is to analyze how the manufacturing ﬁrm sets the wholesale prices
and the transfer payments to maximize its proﬁt. The manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt is equal
to the total revenues in equilibrium minus real costs incurred. More precisely, the objective




B + pBqB (1)
where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the total revenue in market A, the second term
is the real cost of parallel trade between the markets and the third term is the total revenue
in market B.N o t et h a tw i t ht w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs and complete information the manufacturer is
able to extract all economic proﬁts from both distributors.
We assume that at least one distributor can sell in market A, for any w and T accepted
10If this price could be negative it would pay the distributor to order an inﬁnite quantity from the
manufacturing ﬁrm and sell only a limited quantity to consumers, a case we rule out on the grounds of
realism.
11There are several practical justiﬁcations for this assumption of one-way trade. First, if there are ﬁxed
costs (not explicitly modeled in this paper) and market B is small while market A is large, an asymmetry is
possible, with products ﬂowing from the small to the large country but not the other way around. Portugal
and the United Kingdom within the European Union would exemplify this case. Seond, there may be
asymmetric product standards between the two countries. Third, the countries may vary in their legal
treatment of PI, with international exhaustion the rule in A and national exhaustion in B. Good examples
for the former are Australia and Hong Kong, which are open to PI in copyright goods, and good examples
of the latter would be Japan and the United States, which are not (Maskus, 2000).






























































where the condition for the wholesale price ensures that the distributor sells a positive
quantity in that market. The quantities given in equations(2), (3) and (4) characterize all
subgame equilibria and we can proceed to analyze the decision of the manufacturing ﬁrm.
More precisely, the ﬁrm chooses optimal wholesale prices for the distributors.
The optimal choices depend on trade costs. Four possible outcomes emerge as equilibria
for diﬀerent ranges. First, in the range of low trade costs the manufacturing ﬁrm is able to
set optimal wholesale prices in both markets and PI exist. Second, for intermediate trade
costs the ﬁrm is constrained to set a non-negative price in A but can choose an optimal
price in B and PI occur in equilibrium. Third, for high trade costs the manufacturer sets
wholesale prices to deter PI. Finally, suﬃciently high trade costs are prohibitive and markets
will be segmented.
For both low and intermediate trade costs the manufacturing ﬁrm sets wholesale prices to
accommodate the eﬀects of arbitrage. Accordingly, parallel imports occur in equilibrium.
The quantities chosen by distributors are all positive. The equilibrium proﬁt is denoted
ΠPI(w), where superscript PI refers to "parallel imports".
For high trade costs, on the other hand, parallel trade is deterred and no arbitrage occurs.
The margin between the retail price in market A and the wholesale price in market B must
be smaller than the unit trade cost, i.e.
pA (w) − wB ≤ t. (5)
12Details are provied in the appendix.
7I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eq u a n t i t ys o l di nm a r k e tA by distributor B is zero and we refer to this
outcome as the arbitrage-free equilibrium. The proﬁt is denoted ΠNA(w), where NA refers
to "no arbitrage".
Finally, for high trade costs each distributor can only sell in its designated market.13 In
the segmented equilibrium the manufacturing ﬁrm can maximize its proﬁt without being
constrained by an arbitrage condition. It follows immediately that in the segmented equi-
librium the manufacturing ﬁrm sets wholesale prices equal to zero (marginal production
costs) in both markets (i.e. wA =0and wB =0 ) to eliminate the double mark-up problem








We now proceed to analyze the wholesale prices set by the manufacturing ﬁrm in the PI
equilibrium and the arbitrage-free equilibrium and make a comparison with the segmented
equilibrium. We then proceed to analyze consumer welfare
3 .O P T I M A LP R I C I N GA N DP A R A L L E LT R A D E
3A. Retail price divergence
It is natural to start with the analysis in the range of low trade costs. In this situation the
distributor in market B ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sell a positive quantity in market A,i m p l y i n g
that parallel imports occur in equilibrium. Thea n a l y s i si nt h i ss e c t i o ns h o w st h a tp a r a l l e l
trade does not unambiguously result in retail price convergence.
To ﬁnd the optimal wholesale prices we diﬀerentiate the accommodation proﬁt ΠPI(w)
with respect to wholesale prices in the two markets. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect























































The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the wholesale price in market A illustrates two
13More generally, segmentation may also be caused by contractual restrictions and legal barriers.
8of the three problems facing the manufacturer. The ﬁrst term in square brackets is the pro-
competitive eﬀect of parallel imports in market A and it characterizes the manufacturer’s
incentive to control the total supply in that market. Competition between distributors
lowers the manufacturer’s proﬁts. Note that the pro-competitive eﬀect is positive when
wB and the unit trade cost are low. In this situation the ﬁrm would moderate the pro-
competitive eﬀect of arbitrage by raising its wholesale price in market A. In contrast, the
eﬀe c ti sn e g a t i v ew h e nwB and the trade cost are high and the ﬁrm would choose to reduce
wA. The incentive to reduce the volume of arbitrage and charge a low wholesale price in
market A is therefore stronger when the trade cost is high. The second term is the trade-
cost eﬀect, which captures the incentive to save resources wasted in parallel trade. Clearly,
the higher is t the greater the incentive to limit PI by reducing the wholesale price in A.
In the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the wholesale price in market B, the ﬁrst
term in square brackets is the pro-competitive eﬀect of parallel imports in market A. High
trade costs permit the ﬁrm to reduce wB and still limit this competition. Note that the
pro-competitive eﬀect is identical in both (7) and (8). In other words, the manufacturing
ﬁrm has two instruments with which to control the total supply in market A: the wholesale
price in A and the wholesale price in B. The second term in square brackets also reﬂects the
problem with resources used up in trade costs. Here, the trade-cost eﬀect is positive and, to
moderate the volume of arbitrage, the manufacturing ﬁrm would charge a high wholesale
price in market B, while simultaneously charging a low wholesale price in market A.
However, a third term appears in the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the wholesale
p r i c ei nm a r k e tB ,r e ﬂecting the double-markup eﬀect. This is the proﬁt-reducing impact of
double marginalization in market B, referring to the inability of the manufacturer to set the
eﬃcient wholesale price of zero while simultaneously limiting the volume of parallel trade.
The higher is wB,other things equal, the greater the incentive to reduce that price toward
vertical pricing eﬃciency. If the manufacturing ﬁrm is forced by PI to charge a positive
wholesale price in B its revenues in that market would be reduced because the monopoly
distributor there would set a retail price above the optimal (revenue-maximizing) level for
the IPR holder.14 The manufacturing ﬁrm thus has an incentive to keep the wholesale price
in B low in order to minimize the double-markup problem.
Having analyzed the incentives of the manufacturing ﬁrm we can solve the system of equa-
tions consisting of the two ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (8) to ﬁnd the optimal wholesale
14T h i si n s i g h te x p l a i n sw h yt h e r ei sn od o u b l e - m a r k u pp r o b l e mi nA, where the distributor must compete
with imports and is not a monopolist. Increases in wA accordingly reﬂect conditions of competition and
generate proﬁt-maximizing retail prices there.















where both prices are continuous and linear functions in the unit trade cost t. The wholesale
price in market A( B )is a decreasing (increasing) function of the trade cost. Note that
the wholesale price in market A is non-negative for t ∈ [0,t], which is the range of low






Our results support two observations. First, the lower are the trade costs, the stronger is
the incentive to reduce the pro-competitive eﬀect by raising the wholesale price in A (note
that wA rises as t falls). Thus, for low trade costs, few resources are wasted by PI and
the manufacturer would reduce competition by increasing the wholesale price in A as costs
fall further. Second, declining trade costs not only reduce the waste from PI, they also
permit the ﬁrm to decrease the wholesale price in market B and reduce the double-markup
distortion. Thus, parallel trade has an eﬀect on vertical price control that is opposite to
the typical eﬀect of arbitrage in price-discrimination models. The wholesale price in the
importing country increases as the unit trade cost falls, despite an increasing volume of
parallel imports. Correspondingly, the wholesa l ep r i c ei nt h ee x p o r tm a r k e td e c r e a s e sw h e n
the unit trade cost falls. Consequently, wholesale prices in the two markets diverge rather
than converge in the presence of smaller trade impediments.
We insert the optimal wholesale prices into (2) and (3) to obtain the subgame perfect
equilibrium quantities. We then insert the equilibrium outputs into the inverse demand















where both functions are continuous and linear in trade costs. Thus, in the range of low
trade costs a decline (increase) in t generates a divergence (convergence) in retail prices.
We can summarize our result for the range of low trade costs as follows:
Proposition 1 Assume that retail markets are segmented and the unit trade cost of parallel
10trade is t ∈ [0,t). If the trade cost increases in this range, the retail price in market A
decreases, the retail price in market B increases and the volume of PI decreases.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately from the optimal
retail prices in (12) and (13). The volume of arbitrage is equivalent to the quantity chosen
by distributor B in market A. We insert the equilibrium wholesale prices to obtain the











t if t ∈ [0,t] (14)
which is a continuous and declining function of the trade cost.
It is also worth noting that the volume of arbitrage is an increasing function of the
size parameter S as well as the price-elasticity (captured by parameter b)i nm a r k e tB.
The manufacturing ﬁrm has an incentive to keep the wholesale price in that market low
when the size of that market is large and when the customers in the export market are
price-sensitive. In this case the manufacturing ﬁrm is willing to accept a larger volume of
arbitrage to avoid a serious double-markup problem in B.
One interesting aspect of the parallel trade equilibrium is that at a unit trade cost of
zero the retail prices are identical to those that would be set by a vertically integrated
monopolist. In other words, the manufacturing ﬁrm can solve the vertical control problem
perfectly if no real resources are wasted in arbitrage and consumer markets are segmented.
The wholesale price in market B would be set to zero and the wholesale price in market
A would be set at a prohibitive level for the distributor there, pushing it out of business.
Distributor B would sell the revenue-maximizing quantity in both markets and A would
be supplied from B but no real resources would be used in transportation. In addition,
there would be no double markup problem in market B. Consequently, the retail prices in
an integrated equilibrium would be identical to the prices set in a completely segmented
equilibrium. This result stems from the endogenous decision by the manufacturer as trade
costs fall to shift the source of supply from the distributor in A to the distributor in B.P u t
diﬀerently, market integration through declining trade costs induces the ﬁrm to consolidate
the number of distributors. Once distributor B becomes the sole supplier at zero trade cost,
the manufacturer would choose to authorize exports from B to A, implying that PI would
be replaced by standard trade. In eﬀect, the result would be a market integrated at the
wholesale level but segmented at the retail level by a single distributor with two territories.
113B. A pro-competitive eﬀect of parallel imports
For suﬃciently high trade costs, i.e. a unit cost above the critical threshold t,t h eo p t i m a l
wholesale price in market A would be negative, meaning that the manufacturing ﬁrm would
like to sponsor the supply of distributor A in that market through a variable subsidy and
recoup this subsidy by charging a higher ﬁxed fee. As discussed earlier we have ruled out
this possibility on grounds that eﬀective monitoring may be impossible. Therefore, the ﬁrm
must determine the proﬁt-maximizing wholesale price in market B subject to the condition
that the wholesale price in market A is zero.
This constraint adds an additional distortion and further complicates the vertical control
problem. The maximization problem is now reduced to ﬁnding the solution to the ﬁrst-order




























As before, the ﬁrst term reﬂects the pro-competitive eﬀect in A, the second term is the
trade-cost eﬀe c ta n dt h et h i r dt e r mr e ﬂects the double-markup problem in B.
The important diﬀerence compared to the ﬁrst-order condition when the manufacturing
ﬁrm could charge an optimal wholesale price in market A resides in the ﬁrst term. The
manufacturing ﬁrm has an incentive to charge a lower wholesale price in market B to avoid
generating a double-markup problem in market A.15 Hence, the wholesale price in B is
lower than it would be if wA could be negative. We solve the ﬁrst-order condition (15) to







In this case, as trade cost goes up the manufacturer would reduce the volume of PI by
raising the wholesale price in market B.H o w e v e r ,i ti sn o tp r o ﬁtable for the manufacturing
ﬁrm to block PI completely by this strategy because it would create an excessively large
double-markup eﬀect in B. The higher the trade cost, the stronger is the incentive to reduce
the volume of PI. This incentive is a combination of two eﬀects: a higher trade cost wastes
more resources in PI and also protects market A from competition. These eﬀects reduce
the net cost of limiting PI with an ineﬃcient wholesale price in market B. Accordingly, the
wholesale price in B increases with t while the wholesale price in A w o u l db ek e p ta tt h e
15In contrast to the unconstrained case, the possibility of a double-markup problem in A arises because
of the minimum pricing constraint, which might prevent establishment of the optimal retail price.
12minimum level of zero. As previously we insert the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities
from (2) and (3) in the inverse demand functions to obtain the retail prices in markets A
























where both functions are continuous and linear in t. It is interesting to note that both retail
prices would increase with higher trade costs.
For suﬃciently high trade costs, parallel trade becomes unproﬁtable and no arbitrage




, the volume of parallel
trade is positive. The critical threshold for eliminating arbitrage is given by
pA − wB = t, (19)
where pA is given by (17) and wB is given by (16). Accordingly, the upper threshold at









which takes values on the open interval (0,1/2). The threshold level is consequently strictly
positive and less than the prohibitive unit trade cost (t =1 /2) for relevant values of S and
b.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t
Proposition 2 Assume that retail markets are segmented and the unit trade cost of parallel




. If the trade cost increases in this range, the retail prices in market A and
B both increase and the volume of PI decreases.
Proof. For the purpose of proving the proposition, note that the optimal retail prices (17)
and (18) are linear and increasing functions in t. Second, insert the equilibrium wholesale




















which is a continuous and declining of trade costs.
The evolution of the retail price diﬀerential between markets A and B is also interesting
in the intermediate range of trade costs. Both retail prices are increasing in trade costs.
Moreover, retail prices diverge as the trade cost increases. Using the equilibrium prices (17)
13and (18) we compute the diﬀerence between retail prices, i.e. pA − pB. The derivative of







which is strictly positive. In other words, retail prices diﬀer more for high trade costs than
for low trade costs. This result is the outcome of the manufacturing ﬁrm’s incentive to
set a wholesale price in market B to reduce the volume of PI while keeping the wholesale
price in market A at zero. Put diﬀerently, suppose unit trade cost declines in this range.
The manufacturer would accommodate a larger volume of PI while also choosing a lower
wholesale price in market B. As a result, the pro-competitive eﬀect of PI in market A gets
stronger and the double-markup eﬀect in market B gets weaker. The retail prices in both
markets consequently decrease and tend to converge as trade costs fall.
The essence of the analysis in this subsection is that, because the manufactureur no
longer has the ability to set the wholesale price in A optimally, it is limited to using only
the wholesale price in B to manage these various tradeoﬀs. Accordingly, the ﬁrm must
permit a higher PI volume, magnifying the pro-competitive impact in market A.
3C. A double-markup problem with arbitrage-free prices




, the manufacturing ﬁrm sets wholesale prices to deter
PI and the equilibrium is, consequently, arbitrage free. In this equilibrium the distributor
in B ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sell a positive quantity in her own market but does not ship goods
to market A.
Noting that the wholesale price in A must be non-negative, i.e. wA ≥ 0,w ed i ﬀerentiate
the arbitrage-free proﬁt function ΠNA(w) with respect to wholesale prices in the two mar-
kets, subject to the condition in inequality (5) to ﬁnd the optimal wholesale prices. These
prices in the arbitrage-free equilibrium are





This result has a straightforward interpretation. The higher the trade cost, the more
protected is market A by the natural barrier and, further, the wholesale price in market B
can be lowered to reduce the double-markup eﬀect in B. This price would be set both to
deter PI and limit the price distortion in B.W h e nt reaches its maximum level (i.e. t =1 /2),
14the optimal wholesale price in B becomes zero and the price distortion disappears. The















We have the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that retail markets are segmented and the unit trade cost of parallel




. In this range of trade costs, the retail price in market A is equivalent
to the retail price in the segmented equilibrium. Moreover, if the trade cost increases, the
retail price in market B decreases.
Proof. The proposition follows from (25) and (26).
T h er e t a i lp r i c ei nB declines with trade costs because the manufacturing ﬁrm sets a
wholesale price in this market to deter PI. This wholesale price reﬂects a double-markup
distortion that diminishes with higher t. Thus, for higher trade costs the manufacturing ﬁrm
would eliminate PI with a lower wholesale price and experience a correspondingly weaker
double-marginalization problem. In this case equilibrium retail prices diverge as trade cost
increases, which is more in line with the usual intuition. The potential competition from
arbitrage is strong when the trade cost is low and weak when the trade cost is high.
Note that pB = 1
2b at t =1 /2. For prohibitive trade costs, i.e. t>1/2, markets are fully
segmented.
4. PRICES, PROFITS AND CONSUMER WELFARE
The analysis of prices in the previous section characterizes the equilibrium for all trade
costs and other parameter values. In this section we take a closer look at retail prices,
proﬁts and consumer welfare. We are particularly interested in comparing the equilibrium
in a market subject to actual or potential PI competition with the segmented equilibrium.
4A. Retail prices
We ﬁrst take a closer look at retail prices for diﬀerent trade costs. Equilibrium retail
prices in the two markets are illustrated in Figure 1. The upper line corresponds to pA
and the lower line corresponds to pB. The horizontal lines indicate fully segmented price
levels. The ﬁrst vertical line demarcates the lower-threshold, below which the non-negativity
15constraint does not bind and retail prices diverge with a decreasing trade cost. This range
corresponds to accommodation equilibrium conditions and PI are positive. Proceeding to
intermediate trade costs, prices increase but grow apart as t increases in the second range,
which corresponds also to positive volumes of PI. The second vertical line demarcates the
upper threshold of t for which PI exist. In the third range, corresponding to the arbitrage-
free case, retail price is at its monopoly level in Market A but falls in Market B.A b o v et h a t
range of trade cost the markets become fully segmented.
It is straightforward to see that the arbitrage-free equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by
a completely segmented equilibrium. This follows directly from the fact that the retail
price in market B is higher than the segmented retail price (because of the double-markup
problem), the retail price in market A equals the segmented retail price and the proﬁto f























Fig. 1. Equilibrium Retail Prices in Markets A and B (S=1, b=2).
164B. Proﬁts
Next, we compute the manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt in equilibrium (see the appendix for
details). It is illustrated as a function of the variable trade cost in Figure 2. For low trade
costs (t<t ), the proﬁt decreases as trade cost rises because of both more resources lost in
parallel trade activities and an increasing inability to induce optimal retail prices in both




, the proﬁtg o e su pa st r a d ec o s t si n c r e a s e .
The importance of the trade cost as a natural barrier increases, parallel imports vanish,





, the proﬁta l s oi n c r e a s e sw i t ht. The equilibrium is arbitrage-free
and no resources are wasted in trade. The double-marginalization problem in the export
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Fig. 2. The Manufacturing Firm’s Proﬁt (S=1, b=2)
174C. Consumer welfare
Finally, we analyze consumer welfare with PI and exclusive territories. Both competition
policy and market integration policy typically have the objective of enhancing consumer
welfare and maximizing consumer surplus. It is therefore of interest to evaluate the eﬀects
of PI on consumer welfare when the manufacturing ﬁrm employs two-part tariﬀs for vertical
control purposes. We compare these eﬀects to the welfare outcome when the manufacturing
ﬁrm is permitted to segment the wholesale market with exclusive territories and discriminate
with diﬀerent prices in the two countries.























where the ﬁrst term is consumer surplus in A and the second term is consumer surplus in B.











which is continuous, concave and decreasing in both pA and pB.
Diﬀerentiating consumer surplus with respect to t in the accommodation range of low















,( 2 9 )






















2S − Sb+2 Sbt
8
. (31)
It is straightforward to show that combined consumer surplus in markets A and B has its
unique global minimum at t = t. This has an intuitive explanation. In any arbitrage-free
equilibrium, the retail price in market A is at its maximum and identical to the segmented
price. At the same time, the retail price in B has its maximum at t a n di ss t r i c t l yh i g h e r
18than the segmented price. Here, the manufacturing ﬁrm charges the highest wholesale price
in that market to ensure that prices are arbitrage-free, since the trade cost is only a partial
barrier for parallel imports. In other words, for high trade costs both combined consumer
surplus and producer proﬁts are lower when parallel trade is permitted than when the
manufacturing ﬁrm can segment the wholesale market with exclusive territories.
In addition, for two suﬃciently similar markets, i.e. b<b (S), parallel trade has a
negative eﬀect on aggregated consumer surplus at low and intermediate trade costs. The
unique potential local maximum for consumer welfare at interior trade costs, t ∈ (0,1/2),
is at the lower critical threshold t. Accordingly, market segmentation dominates PI as long
as consumer welfare at this trade cost is lower than the consumer welfare in a segmented
equilibrium. We insert equilibrium prices from the PI equilibrium at t and the segmented
equilibrium into the consumer surplus function. We then set the two levels equal and solve











9+1 4 S +2 5 S2 (32)
a n dw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t
Proposition 4 For suﬃciently similar markets, i.e. b<b , joint consumer surplus has its
global maxima at t =0and t = 1
2 (see ﬁgure 3).
Proof. First, note that retail prices are equal to the segmented prices at t =0and
t = 1
2. Consumer surplus is consequently the same at these two points. Second, consumer




i ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a nc o n s u m e r
surplus in the segmented equilibrium as pA is identical to the segmented price and pB is





the derivative of the consumer surplus function is strictly negative and consumer surplus
reaches its maximum at t in this interval (both retail prices increase in t in this range).
Finally, consumer surplus in a segmented equilibrium is constant and consumer surplus in
the range of low trade costs is quadratic and strictly convex in t (the derivative is linear
and increasing in t). The two consumer surplus levels, consequently, can only be equal at
two trade cost levels and consumer surplus must be lower in any interior PI equilibrium
than in the segmented equilibrium. The ﬁrst trade cost is t =0 . The second is
t =
S (4 − 2b)
Sb+4
(33)











9+1 4 S +2 5 S2 (34)
which is suﬃcient for the consumer surplus to be lower in the PI equilibrium than in the
segmented equilibrium. Consumer surplus is consequently lower in an equilibrium open to
PI than in a segmented equilibrium for any t ∈ (0,1/2),i fb<b .
While parallel trade is beneﬁcial for consumers in the import market for low and inter-
mediate trade costs, it is not in the interest of the consumers of both countries taken as
a group and it also damages producers. On the contrary, if the manufacturing ﬁrm uses
two-part tariﬀs to solve vertical control problems, a policy of permitting exclusive territories
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Fig. 3. Combined Consumer Surplus (S =1 ,b= b)
On the other hand, for suﬃciently diﬀerent countries parallel trade may increase consumer
w e l f a r e( s e eF i g u r e4 ) . I nt h er a n g eo fl o wt r a de costs consumer surplus is an increasing
function in t for b ≥ 2. In this case, combined consumer surplus has its maximum at t.
Consumers can jointly beneﬁt when the manufacturing ﬁrm sets prices to minimize the
volume of parallel trade. The diﬀerence in retail prices reaches its minimum at t,w h e r e
20the aggregated consumer surplus is highest. This is akin to the classical welfare eﬀect of
uniform pricing: price convergence increases aggregate consumer surplus as long as total
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Fig. 4. Combined Consumer Surplus (S =1 ,b=2 )
This result shows that consumers in both markets may jointly beneﬁtf r o mp a r a l l e li m -
ports for low and intermediate trade costs as long as the diﬀerence in the price elasticity of
demand is suﬃciently large between the two consumer groups. The intuition for this result
is that the pro-competitive eﬀect of PI in A would dominate the double-markup eﬀect in B
since the optimal price in the latter market would be suﬃciently low to induce a signiﬁcant
price reduction in the former market.
5. RETAIL ARBITRAGE
We initially assumed that retail markets are segmented, justifying the realism of this as-
sumption on the grounds of varying exhaustion policies, product standards, and diﬀerential
market sizes. While we think these factors are relevant in a broad class of goods, readers
may wonder about the implications of retail arbitrage in the model. Thus, in this section
we relax the assumption of retail segmentation.
21First, consider the possibility that consumers could engage in perfectly elastic retail ar-
bitrage. Consumer arbitrage is not proﬁtable if the retail price diﬀerential is less than the
unit trade cost t. Formally, the no-arbitrage condition is
pA − pB ≤ t (35)
and we insert the retail prices and solve for the critical trade cost. A suﬃcient condition
for retail markets to be segmented in this case is t ≥ e t,w h e r e
e t =
S (b − 1)
2+3 Sb
. (36)
Note that this threshold is lower than t meaning that this form of arbitrage limits the range
of price divergence more than does the ﬁrst form. Nevertheless, a range of price divergence
continues as trade costs fall. Observe that the threshold is close to zero for b close to 1.
Markets remain segmented at the retail level by the natural barrier t for similar markets or
high trade costs. For dissimilar markets and low trade costs, arbitrage at the retail level
could limit the scope for price diﬀerentiation and prices would converge. Figure 5 illustrates
the consumer-level retail arbitrage conditions. The solid lines depict retail prices in markets
A and B. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the threshold level e t at which consumer
arbitrage would kick in. For trade costs below that level prices would tend to converge
along the dashed lines making up the retail price cone (p0
A and p0
B), as shown.
Next, consider the possibility that the retail services provided in market A are necessary
complements for consumption there. In other words, the distributor in market A (or an
agent) can import the product from B but consumers in A cannot buy the product at the
retail level in B. Arbitrage by distributor A (in which he buys at the retail level abroad in
order to ﬁnd a cheaper source of supply than the available wholesale price) is not proﬁtable
if the margin between the wholesale price in market A and the retail price in market B is
lower than the unit trade cost t. Formally, the no-arbitrage condition in this case is
wA − pB ≤ t (37)
and in order to determine whether this condition is slack in equilibrium we insert the
accommodation wholesale price in market A and the retail price in market B.As u ﬃcient
condition for retail markets to be segmented in this case is
t>








































































Fig. 5. Retail prices with retail arbitrage (S=1, b=1.5)
where the right hand side is close to zero for b close to 1. Markets are consequently segmented
at the retail level by the natural barrier t for similar markets or high trade costs. It is
interesting to note that this critical level is substantially lower than the threshold t.T h u s ,
there remains a region of trade costs in which retail prices diverge as t declines, before these
prices begin to converge. For dissimilar markets and low trade costs, however, arbitrage at
t h er e t a i ll e v e lc o u l dl i m i tt h es c o p ef o rp r i c ed i ﬀerentiation and prices would converge.
We reiterate that perfect retail arbitrage is a strong assumption and inconsistent both
with the fact that the bulk of PI occurs at the distributor level and with persistent diﬀerences
in retail prices within the EU. There are good reasons to expect limited arbitrage of this
kind even without restrictions on parallel trade. First, as noted above there are likely to be
complementarities in retail services that cannot be provided by arbitrageurs. Second, there
may be signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs in organizing cross-border retail trade. Third, there may be
large information costs for consumers in determining product prices and characteristics for
purposes of organizing arbitrage. Thus, we think our analysis of distributor-level PI is valid
in many realistic circumstances.
236. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We developed a model in which a manufacturing ﬁrm owns an intellectual property right
in two markets but its ability to limit parallel imports from one market to the other is
exhausted. In this environment, the ﬁrm has the ability to set diﬀerential wholesale prices to
its independent distributors in the two locations. It will use these instruments to maximize
proﬁts within the vertical-control framework. There are three essential tradeoﬀsf o rt h e
manufacturer. It wishes to restrict the extent of competition from PI in the A market,
limit the amount of PI because it wastes real resources in transport costs, and avoid the
double-markup problem in market B arising from the inability to set an eﬃcient (zero)
wholesale price.
Our analysis turned up some interesting results. Because of the cross-cutting eﬀects of PI
on wholesale prices in the two markets, it is possible to observe a divergence in wholesale
prices as trade costs are reduced within a low range. As a result, retail prices may diverge
as well. Arguably, the EU is in a situation of low and declining internal trade restrictions.
In this context, paradoxically, the policy of free parallel trade among member states may
be a force for retail price divergence.
For intermediate and high trade costs, the ﬁrm might wish to set a negative wholesale
price in A but could be constrained to a minimum price of zero. As trade costs increase, the
volume of PI declines and the double-markup problem in B diminishes. Retail prices rise
in both locations as transport costs increase within the intermediate range, then diverge at
high trade costs as these prices achieve levels expected with wholesale-market segmentation.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of our analysis is that there is a substantial
diﬀerence between integrating retail markets and wholesale markets. In the former case, as
trade costs fall due to declining trade barriers and transport costs, straightforward arbitrage
would push markets toward price convergence, which is the intuitive result and the outcome
anticipated by integration policy. However, in the latter case, where PI are prevalent,
declining trade costs could integrate wholesale markets even as they push retail markets
toward greater segmentation. Again, this possibility suggests that the favorable view of
parallel imports in EU competition policy, stemming from a tradition that does not consider
vertical distribution arrangements, may be due for reconsideration.
It could be argued that the double-markup problem in the export market is partly due
to seller concentration at the retail level. The manufacturing ﬁrm perhaps could introduce
several competing retailers to reduce the retail margin and moderate the double marginal-
ization problem. This beneﬁt of having more than one retail distributor could, however,
24be oﬀset by other disadvantages such as free-riding and duplicated ﬁxed costs in retailing.
Hence, extending the analysis to study the eﬀects of parallel trade with an endogenous retail
structure is an interesting subject for future research.
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I ti sa s s u m e dt h a ta tl e a s to n ed i s t r i b u t o rﬁnds it proﬁtable to supply market A. Accord-
ingly, we have to consider three diﬀerent cases: both distributors supply market A, only
distributor A supplies market A or, ﬁnally, only distributor B supplies market A. Consider
duopoly ﬁrst. The distributors compete in quantities in market A. The proﬁt functions of
distributor A and B are
π∗



















B − t =0 , (42)





























These two conditions must simultaneously hold in duopoly and we combine them and rewrite
the expression to obtain
2w∗






















B + t) − 1,
for which q∗
B =0in equilibrium. Then distributor A is the only supplier in A. It maximizes
π∗















which is positive for w∗








B + t ≤ 2w∗
A − 1, (52)
then q∗
A =0in equilibrium and distributor B is the only supplier in A. It maximizes
π∗




and the ﬁrst-order condition is
1 − 2q∗
B − w∗
B − t =0 (54)







which is positive for w∗
B < 1 − t.
The manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt






and correspondlingly retail prices and the PI quantity for low trade costs to obtain the
proﬁt in the PI equilibrium for t<t
ΠPI
t<t =
Sb+5 Sbt2 − 2tSb +4 t2 + S2
4Sb
(57)
and retail prices and the PI quantity for intermediate trade costs to obtain the proﬁti nt h e
PI equilibrium for t ≥ t
ΠPI
t≥t =
8Sb2 +2 0 Sb2t2 − 8tSb2 +9 S2b +1 6 bt2 +4 b +4 S
4b(4 + 9Sb)
(58)
and, ﬁnally, retail prices for high trade costs to obtain the proﬁt in the no-arbitrage equi-
librium
ΠNA =
4b +4 S − Sb2 +4 tSb2 − 4Sb2t2
16b
. (59)
30